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The Gaza Crisis: Hurtling Toward Disaster
By Nicholas S. Kass
November 5th, 2023
In the wake of Hamas’ 7 October terrorist attack on Israeli civilians and the Israeli government’s declaration of retaliatory war in Hamas-controlled Gaza, the Middle East is on the verge of a disaster. Already, the situation is affecting key interests of the United States, Israel’s principal backer, in the region and elsewhere.
The fallout also includes potential spillover effects on US equities in Europe, where the war between Russia and Ukraine—and indirectly against the US and NATO—rages to catastrophic effect.
There is still time to salvage something from the situation, but the room for maneuver is shrinking by the day.
The Hamas terror attack and the war in Gaza understandably evoke strong, visceral emotions. In America, these emotions are having an impact on Washington’s policy debates, as they did in generating post-9/11 policies in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and subsequently, in the fight against the barbarity of the so-called “caliphate” of ISIS.
However, in this respect, the long American experience and record of errors after 9/11 are a cautionary tale. They remind us that for any nation—including the United States—it is important to keep emotions and domestic politics generally from warping or foreclosing the ability to perceive and understand basic realities and developments abroad, which is the crucial foundation upon which wise policymaking must rest.
Israel’s Dilemma
Israel faces a grave strategic dilemma. On the one hand, it is clear that the Israeli government must respond vigorously against the Hamas perpetrators; failure to do so would be to break faith with the Israeli people and perhaps irreparably jeopardize the security of the Israeli state.
On the other hand, it appears that Israel’s effort to destroy Hamas, in what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated will be a long war, is already undermining Israel’s broader strategic equities given the high death toll in Gaza—reportedly 8,000 and counting, as of 31 October.
These concerns may have initially led to disagreements within the Israeli government over whether and how far to push into Gaza, delaying the ground invasion.
Nevertheless, the Netanyahu government apparently has come to the conclusion that a general offensive is the only option. One reason for this may well be domestic political considerations including Netanyahu’s own dim political prospects.
Some opinion polls suggest 80 percent of Israelis blame Netanyahu for Israel’s failure to anticipate the Hamas attack—an intelligence failure so comprehensive that it casts doubt on Israel’s abilities to target Hamas in Gaza without further massive damage and civilian deaths.
Netanyahu may calculate that a long war will put off the day of political reckoning for him. Nevertheless, that day will come eventually, as Israel’s diminished international stature becomes more apparent. In any event, such political calculations could lead Netanyahu to ignore or downplay the likely reaction to his actions in many parts of the world.
Regional Implications
Israel’s attacks in Gaza, with the high prospect of more destruction to come, are scuttling what had been a growing Israeli rapprochement with Sunni Muslim, Arab states in the Middle East.
Israel’s attacks are also damaging its relations with Sunni Turkey, a rising regional power which shares with Arab states and peoples a strong sympathy for the Palestinians.
According to the New York Times on 31 October, “it became evident to U.S. officials that Israeli leaders believed mass civilian casualties were an acceptable price in the military campaign.” Clearly, that is not the case among Muslim countries. The reaction in the region against Israeli war policy toward Gaza and the Palestinians generally likely will spur cooperative efforts in the region and abroad to isolate Israel diplomatically, economically, and potentially involve military deployments as part of an international effort to relieve civilian suffering in Gaza.
Moreover, perceptions of Israeli indifference to the plight of civilians invites condemnation from, and opportunities to demonstrate solidarity among, great powers Russia and China, and others who see such indifference as evidence of Israeli and US perfidy. All told, this would raise the stakes and increase the risks of confrontation.
Meanwhile, there is much condemnation in US and Israel toward Iran, Hamas’ principal backer, with US politicians openly calling for military action against Tehran. In that event, it is likely that Israel would be confronted with attacks from another Iranian client, Lebanese Hizballah, opening a second front on Israel’s northern border that could further destabilize Lebanon. Moreover, US troops in Iraq and Syria, already facing attack from elements sympathetic to Iran, could come under more fire, generating increasingly strong US military responses that could eventually embroil Washington in yet another de facto regional war.
The Key Turkish Angle
Turkey is likely to become a more assertive presence as the crisis continues. Ankara has condemned the Israeli civilian deaths from the 7 October Hamas attack. Nevertheless, in late October, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered a blistering speech at a massive rally in Istanbul, castigating Israel as a war criminal for the nature of its response in Gaza and blaming the United States as well for supporting Israel’s offensive. Days earlier, he described Hamas, which Turkey does not recognize as a terrorist group, as engaged in legitimate struggle.
Erdogan’s return to harsh rhetoric against Israel marks a change for a man who until 7 October had been working assiduously to repair Turkish-Israeli ties, which had been damaged in the wake of Israel’s “Operation Cast Lead” against in Gaza 15 years ago.
Erdogan’s effort to rally Sunni Muslims against Netanyahu reflect his deep convictions and probably had several aims, including exerting pressure on Israel and the US to pursue a cease-fire in Gaza, and promoting Turkish aspirations for a regional leadership role by demonstrating Ankara’s willingness to confront Israel and the US. Erdogan probably also wants to increase Turkish civilizing influence over Sunni Hamas at the expense of Shia Iran, which is Hamas’ principal backer and an ages-old strategic competitor to Turkey in the region.
Erdogan’s willingness to stake out positions that offend Washington’s sensibilities reflects the widespread conviction in Turkey and elsewhere that the US has been the principal source of instability in the Middle East since the dawn of the 21st century, is displaying incompetent leadership in various theaters since 2021, and is a declining power. Turks are acutely aware that as a candidate for President, Joe Biden declared that he would work with the Turkish opposition to bring down Erdogan—which could not fail to be understood as a call for a coup d’etat, Biden’s explicit protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. The Biden Administration has sought to modify some of its anti-Erdogan convictions since the outbreak of the Ukraine war in February 2022 in a bid to win the support of NATO ally Turkey for expanding the Alliance as it confronts Russia, with which Turkey has carefully nurtured ties despite the war. This probably restricts the Biden team’s ability to criticize Ankara regarding its stance on Hamas.
Nevertheless, the perception in Ankara that permanent Washington has long failed to take core Turkish equities in the Middle East and elsewhere into account, and the potential for Congressional efforts to embarrass the Administration and prod it to take a more antagonistic stance toward Turkey could further threaten NATO expansion and cohesion.
Pressure on Turkey regarding Hamas might increase Ankara’s reluctance to support NATO membership for Sweden, particularly given Swedish tolerance of the Marxist origin, terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—long Turkey’s primary security threat.
Moreover, an intramural NATO dispute with Turkey over Sweden would come just as some Allied governments, facing rising pressure from domestic populist movements, are already beginning quietly to consider recalibrating their policies in the wake of the abject failure of the recent Ukrainian counteroffensive against Russian forces in eastern Ukraine.
Terrorism vs. Terrorism
NICK WITH A KURDISH SUFI LEADER IN CIZRE, TURKEY ON THE BORDER WITH SYRIA
More broadly, US policy in another part of the Middle East undercuts Washington’s effort to exact condemnation of Hamas’ terrorism. As far as the Turks are concerned, the US has completely undermined its case for moral leadership due to its support for the PKK’s elements in northeastern Syria.
Most Turks look at US support for PKK proxies as a sign of outright strategic hostility, which colors Turkish security policy in virtually every other respect and direction.
Ostensibly a partnership aimed at eliminating local ISIS remnants—legacies of the instability generated by the disastrous Iraq war—Washington’s de facto abetting of the PKK’s impositions and secularist-revolutionary objectives in a region of more traditionally-minded people threatens stability.
Moreover, it might actually be sustaining, rather than eliminating the threat of a local militant reaction.
The PKK’s suppression of legitimate alternatives to its dominance in northeastern Syria probably encourages some locals to turn to more radical militant organizations, whether ISIS or others.
Western media, NGOs, and governments tend to downplay or ignore concerns about the PKK, often portraying the PKK’s Syrian elements as promoting the latest fashion in Western values. In fact, the PKK routinely threatens and suppresses Syrian Kurds and Arabs–including indigenous Christians–who reject the PKK’s secularist ideology and power interests.
The PKK also engages in kidnappings and forced “recruitment” of Kurdish children into PKK ranks.
Moreover, the PKK threatens the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq—another key US partner in the region.
The PKK has long sought to undermine and overthrow the traditional social, Sufi/Sunni religious, and political structure that, along with Kurdish identity, are the root of the KRG’s stability, political authority, and legitimacy.
The PKK’s prominence in Syria also spurs Turkey to consider intervening militarily as it has on several occasions in recent years, and to sustain a Turkish presence there.
This, in turn raises the prospect of an inadvertent, accidental clash between US forces and Turkish soldiers operating against the local PKK.
Outlook
Some commentators have suggested that the Hamas attack on 7 October was Israel’s 9/11.
If so, then the United States has an obligation to share its experiences and work with Israel, to help it avoid duplicating Washington’s enduring strategic blunders of the post-9/11 era, and abjure policies that whatever their intent are counterproductive, destabilizing, and destructive.
A failure by Washington to do so would be an abdication of its responsibility to safeguard US interests not only in the Middle East, but in Europe and elsewhere.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Nicholas Spyridon Kass is Executive Director for International Corporate Affairs at the Alexandrion Group, based near Bucharest, Romania.
He is also Senior Fellow for European Affairs at the Center for the National Interest in Washington, DC.
Mr. Kass has over thirty years of foreign policy experience with the United States Government (retiring January 2021), as an award-winning analyst, reporter, intelligence collector, diplomat, policy manager, and leader.
He was Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations at the U.S. Department of State (2020-2021), and twice Director for European Affairs (2019-2020, 1999-2001) and Director for Intelligence Programs (2006-2008) at the White House/National Security Council.
He also served as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Europe and senior analyst for Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean and Kurdish issues at the National Intelligence Council (2018-2019), and as a team chief for Legislative Affairs (2004-2006), liaising with the U.S. Congress.
As Deputy Political Counselor (2001-2003) and Political Officer (1995-1998) at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey, Mr. Kass was the Mission’s point officer for developing key relationships with leading politicians, activists, academics, and military and religious leaders.
He also served at the Central Intelligence Agency, including as Intelligence Briefer to the Director of Central Intelligence, and was awarded for unique contributions to the CIA HUMINT mission.
Mr. Kass holds a J.D. from the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America, a Master of Arts in Government from Georgetown University, and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from DePaul University.
He speaks Turkish and Kurdish.
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