The Brics Bloc is a joke?

Poor Iran. Left out in the cold in their time of need.

The Brics Bloc Is a House of Cards

What do Brazil, China, India and Russia have in common? Almost nothing, as the Iran war shows.

By Sadanand Dhume, WSJ

March 11, 2026 4:47 pm ET

President Trump likes to criticize the Brics economic bloc—founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, and subsequently expanded to other nations. The president has described the coalition as “anti-American.” But the current war in Iran suggests that U.S. concerns about Brics are overblown. The group has shown itself to be utterly ineffectual, unable to come up with a unified response to an international crisis.

The current war accentuates rifts within Brics that have long been apparent. Of its five titular members (South Africa joined in 2010), four have criticized the U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran, which joined the bloc two years ago.

But India, which holds the Brics presidency this year, has refused to condemn the U.S. and Israel. New Delhi clearly leans toward Washington and Jerusalem, as well as the Gulf states, rather than toward Tehran. So far, Brics hasn’t issued a statement on the war.

The group’s anti-Western core—consisting of China, Russia and Iran—is tempered by countries with no interest in a confrontational stand against the U.S. and its allies.

The group is riven with conflicting interests. India opposes China’s hegemonic ambitions in Asia, claims on Indian territory and military support for Pakistan, and it welcomes the U.S. naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. Brazil’s policy yo-yos depending on who is in power: The current president, socialist Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, appears to enjoy provoking Washington. His predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, built a close relationship with Mr. Trump. Of the five countries that joined Brics in 2024 and 2025—Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia—only Iran is actively hostile to the U.S.-led international order.

The idea of any kind of unity within the bloc is laughable. Since the war’s outbreak, Iran has pummeled the U.A.E., a fellow Brics member, with missiles and drones.

India’s approach to the conflict illustrates that countries tend to place their national interest above vague notions of non-Western solidarity. India has said it is “deeply concerned” about the conflict and has urged all sides to “avoid escalation.” But beyond this diplomatic boilerplate, New Delhi has signaled where its sympathies lie.

At the end of February, days before the U.S. and Israel bombed Iran, Prime Minister Narendra Modi received a hero’s welcome in Israel. He addressed the Knesset, lit up in the colors of the Indian flag, and emphasized Indian solidarity with Israeli victims of terrorism: “We feel your pain. We share your grief. India stands with Israel, firmly, with full conviction, in this moment and beyond,” Mr. Modi said.

Since the conflict began, Mr. Modi has spoken with Mr. Netanyahu, as well as with the leaders of each of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In a March 1 tweet, Mr. Modi referred to Emirati leader Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan as his “brother” and “strongly condemned the attacks on the U.A.E.”

Mr. Modi hasn’t yet dialed Tehran’s leadership. Neither he nor his foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, signed a condolence book at the Iranian Embassy for the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. They sent a lower-ranking bureaucrat to sign it—a diplomatic snub.

Opposition parties have reacted to India’s tilt against Tehran with predictable outrage. In an op-ed in the Indian Express, Sonia Gandhi, a leader of the Congress Party, called India’s silence on Khamenei’s assassination an “abdication” that “raises serious doubts about the direction and credibility of our foreign policy.”

Other analysts have talked up India’s supposed civilizational ties with Iran, the aggrieved sentiments of Indian Shiite Muslims, and an Indian bid to develop the Iranian port of Chabahar as a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Some are angry that the U.S. torpedoed an Iranian naval frigate near Sri Lanka that was returning from naval exercises hosted by India.

But while Iran isn’t entirely unimportant to India, the Modi government has done its strategic math. India would benefit from an Iran that ceases to spread terrorism and threaten its neighbors. The U.S. is India’s largest trading partner and its most important source of technology. Israel in recent decades has become a vital supplier of weapons and military technology to India, including in last year’s four-day India-Pakistan conflict.

The Gulf states house nearly nine million Indian citizens, whose remittances ($45 billion in 2023-24) help keep India’s current account deficit in check. India’s goods trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2024 was more than $180 billion. India-Iran trade last year totaled a mere $1.6 billion. India imports the vast majority of its liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas. More than 80% of India’s LPG imports and more than half its LNG imports come from the Gulf.

India’s cold shoulder to Iran highlights the hollowness of Brics. The bloc lets diplomats rack up frequent flyer miles, and politicians pose for pictures with other leaders. But on the world stage it counts for next to nothing.